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CULTIVATING QUALITY:
TEN TOOLS MANAGERS CAN USE TO GET
LONG-TERM COMMITTED SHAREHOLDERS
Lawrence A. Cunningham
George Washington University
Center for Law, Economics & Finance
ABSTRACT
Considerable effort goes into forging tools a corporation can use to shape its shareholder
base. Much effort is geared toward promoting long investor time horizons, presumed to be a
valuable but rare appetite among many shareholders. Less attention has been focused on
promoting greater commitment, though attracting shareholders willing to stake large percentages
of their portfolio in a given company’s stock may prove way more valuable than having numerous
large index funds on the shareholder list.
In three ways, this article adds to the toolkit on shareholder cultivation. First, this article
stresses that a shareholder’s relative portfolio concentration in a particular company’s stock is as
important as average holding periods. Such an orientation is unusual in corporate life. But today’s
world is dominated by index fund investors whose portfolio diversification limits their ability to
act as informed shareholders. A focus on relative portfolio concentration is therefore becoming
critical.
Second, this discussion introduces, and is motivated by, new evidence showing a
correlation between a high density of such shareholders and superior corporate performance. In
fact, shareholders exhibiting both traits—patience and conviction—have long been cultivated by
an elite group of companies whose long-term performance has benefited. The most famous is
Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway and there are scores of other less famous but equally
accomplished.
Third, focusing on such quality shareholders, as Buffett long ago dubbed them, this article
offers numerous tools a corporation may use to achieve a shareholder base with a high density of
quality shareholders. These include communications strategies, such as stressing long-term
performance metrics in corporate disclosure, and substantive practices, such as prioritizing the
art of capital allocation. Managers and quality shareholders themselves are the target audience.
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INTRODUCTION
So complex is today’s shareholder demographic that some say it is akin to the U.S.
Electoral College—an arcane but powerful maze intelligent candidates must master.1 Just as
Presidential campaigns first lock up their base and then seek the swing voter, corporate leaders
must first secure a faithful shareholder cohort and then assure any further votes that might
determine voting outcomes. The map varies by company, but consists of activists, indexers,
transients, and long-term concentrated owners. As in politics, these groups may be as reliable as
California or Texas, or as up-for-grabs as Ohio or Pennsylvania.
While the analogy is intriguing, there is one huge difference between political and
corporate elections. Unlike politicians, who are stuck with the citizens they face, directors can
influence the mix of the make-up of their shareholder base, in terms of such important features as
time horizon, commitment level, and engagement.
Many managers use their bully pulpit to deter shareholders unaligned with their corporate
philosophy. At a Starbuck’s shareholders meeting, Howard Schultz told a shareholder challenging
the company’s hiring practices that he should sell the stock. Joe Steinberg so advised a Leucadia
shareholder challenging the company’s hold-or-divest policies. In a letter to shareholders of The
Washington Post Co., Don Graham stressed the company’s long-term outlook, adding: “If you are
a shareholder and YOU care about our quarterly results, perhaps you should think about selling
the stock.”
Besides hectoring, a variety of tools have been shown to be useful in sculpting a
shareholder base. Analysis has focused heavily on practices designed to entice long-term
shareholders. They span the range of corporate affairs, from by-laws to mission statements and
governance philosophy to dividend policy.
This Article contributes three transformative points. First it adds to time horizon the feature
of concentration, establishing a focus on quality shareholders (hereinafter abbreviated as QS).2
Second, it provides new evidence of the value of this perspective, from the perspective of both QS
and the companies they invest in. Third, it explores how numerous corporate practices can be used
to attract QS.
Cultivation options include communications strategies such as mounting appealing annual
meetings, issuing candid annual shareholder letters, dampening quarterly forecasting, and stressing
long-term performance measures. Substantively, cultivation options include developed and
publicized standards governing capital allocation, from acquisitions to dividends, as well as
divestitures, and governance strategies such as board selection criteria and enhanced shareholder
voting rights for coveted shareholder cohorts.
1

See James Woolery, Rob Leclerc & Richard Fields, The Ashland-Cruiser Proxy Contest—A Case
Study, HARV. GOV. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2019).
2

The abbreviation QS for quality shareholders conveys both an informal and formal meaning. The
informal sense is of shareholders who are among the most patient and most concentrated among
shareholders. The formal definition is based on a variety of statistical methods used to identify those
possessing such features from the entire population of institutional shareholders obliged under federal
securities laws to disclose such information. The research is explained in LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM,
QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS: HOW MANAGERS ATTRACT THE BEST SHAREHOLDERS (2020), App. A.
3

These perspectives are necessitated by changing shareholder demographics. The rise of
indexing, including its seemingly effortless strategy of investing along with enormous power in
voting, has crowded out the share of corporate equity held by QS. The latter is down to as little as
$4 trillion in assets, in all, compared to a total market capitalization exceeding $30 trillion. This
Article responds to the fact that the quality population has been shrinking. It stresses the untapped
potential of QS and offers methods to attract and cultivate them.

I. STAKES
This Part opens with a review of the literature on corporate cultivation to shareholder tastes.
It turns to the current landscape, indicating that the literature warrants updating in light of the rise
of indexers and the appeal of quality.
A. Past Practice
The shareholder cultivation literature coalesces around a discrete group of practices and
variations on their themes, with greatest attention focused on long-term versus short-term
shareholders. Encompassing the recognized elements of corporate administration, this body of
research can provide a useful framework for organizing analysis. Yet a review of this literature
entices attention to the gaps it leaves, in both the available practices and the relevant shareholder
types.
The literature’s most general treatments cover many of the topics appearing on most syllabi
for a basic course in corporations, such as place of incorporation and transfer restrictions 3 as well
as stock exchange listings and the content of bylaws.4 For example, a Delaware incorporation and
New York Stock Exchange listing signal credibility that’s important to certain investors and will
attract them. While importantly treating hotly contested topics of corporate governance, such as
board structures and director independence,5 the result is a selective and provisional body of work.
Among specific topics receiving significant attention in this literature are corporate
communications,6 including particular focus on the statement of corporate mission7 as well as
deterring short-term shareholders by avoiding emphasis on quarterly earnings and forecasts.8 On

3

See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 849

4

See Tamara Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789

(2012).
(2014).
See Alicia J. Davis, The Institutional Appetite for “Quack Corporate Governance,” COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 1 (2015) (the title’s quoted clause references its critique of influential piece it critiques).
5

6

See Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from
Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822 (2011).
7

See Henry T.C. Hu, Corporate Governance: Buffett, Corporate Objectives, and the Nature of
Sheep, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 394 (1987).
8

See Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate Efficiency and Political
Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 131 (2014) (noting that law’s
requirements are limited to disclosure under the reasonable investor standard); Nadelle Grossman, Turning
a Short-Term Fling into a Long-Term Commitment: Board Duties in a New Era, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
905, 915-918 (2010) (short-term information bias inherent in the type of information required to be
4

the other hand, less detailed attention has examined two tools of particular use in attracting QS:
the annual meeting9 and annual letter to shareholders.10 Perhaps or central importance to attracting
QS, the literature has treated aspects of capital allocation prominently, especially dividends and
buybacks,11 though not acquisitions or divestitures.12
The literature has devoted considerable analysis of alternative capital structures, some as
part of the broader debate on dual class capital structures.13 In a related vein, increasing thought
is given to tailoring shareholder voting rules to cater to desired cohorts, especially time-weighted
voting14 or granting enhanced voting rights to a separate class of long-term shares.15 I have recently
contributed the specific perspective of QS by putting forth a proposal for enhanced voting power
for QS, based on both long holding periods and high portfolio concentration.16
Much of this literature consciously focuses on investment time horizons,17 exploring the
practices that attract or repel long-term rather than short-term shareholders,18 Some work draws

disclosed); Lynne L. Dallas, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541,
560 (2016); Rock, supra note 3, at 870; Rodrigues, supra note 6, at 1850.
9
See Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the Impact of
Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 1012-15 (2014) (noting potential for
richer periodic narrative messages to shareholders, along with related structural changes); Rock, supra note
xx (noting Buffett’s influential letters).
10

See Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate Efficiency and Political
Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 144-145 (2014) (robust
discussions at regular corporate meetings can shape the shareholder base); see also Rock, supra note 3, at
904-05; compare Belinfanti, supra note 4, at 842 (relative appeal of annual meetings depends on topics
discussed).
11

See William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEO. L. J. 845 (2005); Belinfanti, supra

note 4.
12

See Edward S. Adams & Arijit Mukherji, Spin-Offs, Fiduciary Duty, and the Law, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 15, 41-50 (1999) (noting that spin-offs can be value enhancing for shareholders); York Schnorbus,
Tracking Stock in Germany: Is German Corporate Law Flexible Enough To Adopt American Financial
Innovations?, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 541 (2001) (tracking stocks enhance shareholder value).
13

See Ron W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J.
FIN. 1697 (2009); Young Ran (Christine) Kim & Geeyoung Min, Insulation by Separation: When DualClass Stock Met Corporate Spin-Offs, 10 U.C. IRVINE. L. REV. 1, 22-29 (2019); Rock, supra note 3.
14

See Dallas, supra note 8.

15

See Patrick Bolton & Frederic Samama, L-Shares: Rewarding Long-term Investors, 25 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 86 (2013); Belinfanti, supra note 4.
16

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality Shareholders, 63 BYU L. REV.
--- (forthcoming 2020).
17

E.g., Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J.
1554 (2015).
18

See Emeka Duruigbo, Stimulating Long-Term Shareholding, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1733, 1733
(2012); Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism and Managerial Myopia, 100 KY. L.J. 531
(2011/2012).
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explicit attention to relative percentage ownership share ownership of the corporation.19 But none
addresses relative portfolio concentration at all, whether alone or in combination with time
horizon.20 The topics addressed in this Article have been chosen generally because of their undertreatment in this literature and specifically because of their unique appeal to QS, both long-term
and concentrated.
B. Today’s Index Dominance
In decades past, shareholders seemed to be monolithic. In 1965, for example, institutional
investors held $436 billion of $1.4 trillion in total market capitalization, with nearly $1 trillion
owned by individual households. Managers could view individual stockholders as sharing similar
interests, principally long-term corporate value, and giving managers broad discretion to pursue it.
Less than 15% of the market, or $100 billion, was held by the day’s mutual funds, pension funds,
and insurance companies (respectively holding $36, $43, and $21 billion 5%, 6%, and 3%).21 The
appetites of such firms did not differ greatly from one another or from the individual investor.
Over the past several decades, shareholders have become increasingly diverse and more
demanding of managers. These range from indexers who buy everything to high-frequency traders
who flip every minute. Some shareholder activists prescribe strategies for maximum short-term
shareholder gain through divestitures while socially oriented activists make shareholder proposals
in the name of environmental, social and governance (ESG) objectives.
Several seismic forces contributed to the changed demographics. The broadest was the
eclipse of individual shareholders by institutional investors. Since 2016, institutions have held the
vast majority of the $30+ trillion in total market capitalization, with mutual funds, pension funds,
and insurance companies together commanding a decisive majority (respectively, $9.1 trillion,
$2.3 trillion, and $811 billion).22
Among institutions, three critical changes have occurred in recent decades. In the context
of the shareholder cultivation literature, the most important has been the substantial shortening of
average holding periods, indicative of increased trading for arbitrage, momentum strategies, and
other short-term drivers. Average holding periods they shortened significantly from the mid-1960s
through the early 2000;23 while the average has held steady since, this appears to be due to how
the shorter horizons of many are offset by the more permanent holdings of the indexers.24 Best19

E.g., Belinfanti, supra note 4, at 829 (referencing twenty percent ownership level without
triggering shareholder vote under state corporate law or registration under federal securities law).
20

One exception is Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality Shareholders, supra note 16.

21

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States:
Historical Annual Tables (1965-1974).
22
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States:
Historical
Annual
Tables
(2005-2015),
at;
123
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/annuals/a2005-2015.pdf; Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States, Second Quarter 2018 at 130,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20180920/z1.pdf.
23

Anne M. Tucker, The Long and The Short: Portfolio Turnover Ratios & Mutual Fund Investment
Time Horizons, 43 J. CORP. L. 581 (2018).
24
K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and
Firm Value, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387, at n. 42 (2018).
6

selling author, Michael Lewis, dramatized the stakes in his 2014 book, Flash Boys, and the pace
of acceleration continues with sustained technological advances in computing algorithms, artificial
intelligence and machine learning.25
Related to the issue of short-termism has been the rise of activism. Shareholder gadflies
have roamed corporate America since the Gilbert brothers popularized the practice in the 1950s.26
And from the 1970s through the 1990s, incumbent managers always faced constant threats to
corporate control from rival firms, takeover artists, and colorful raiders such as Carl Icahn and
Nelson Peltz.27 But it is only in the past two decades that a vast pool of capital developed among
specialty firms, dubbed shareholder activists, dedicated to the practice featuring a well-developed
playbook, a cadre of professional advisers, and repeat players such as Bill Ackman, Dan Loeb and
Paul Singer.28
Yet while the shareholder cultivation literature has considered time horizon—including
among activism—the foremost demographic change has been neglected: the large and growing
percentage of shares are held by indexers. Indexing, popularized by the late Jack Bogle, was a
marginal practice through the 1990s, but today is a familiar approach. His company, Vanguard, is
a household name. Large indexers command trillions of assets, representing one-quarter to onethird or more of total U.S. public company equity. In 1997, less than 8% of mutual funds were
indexed, whereas today more than 40% are.
A substantial literature is emerging to address the rise of indexers, but mainly to debate
whether their influence is too great or how they perform their oversight functions.29 There has been
no discussion of this cohort in the shareholder cultivation literature. In one way, that’s
unsurprising: indexers need no cultivation or enticing since they buy every stock in the index.
Indeed, to the extent concern rivets on short-termism, indexers may receive a critical pass, as they
are generally long-term holders (subject to forced sales due to rebalancing). On the other hand, the
omission is glaring, since the more indexers own the less room there is for quality. Quality
shareholders are congenial to private corporations and public policy alike.
C. Advantages of Quality
Each shareholder segment adds unique value: activists promote management
accountability; index funds enable millions to enjoy market returns at low cost; and traders offer
liquidity. With such advantages, however, come disadvantages: activists becoming overzealous;
25

See Tom C. W. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 531

(2019).
26

See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Stephanie Cuba, Annual Shareholder Meetings: From Populist
to Virtual, FIN. HIS. (Fall 2018).
27

See KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds.

1988).
28

See WILLIAM W. BRATTON & JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY, INTRODUCTION TO INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR ACTIVISM: HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY, ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 1-38 (2015).
29

See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019) (agency cost indictment of indexer
capability) with Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street:
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2019) [hereinafter Fisch, The New
Titans] (ringing theoretical defense of indexer capability).
7

indexers lacking resources to understand specific company details; and traders inducing a shortterm focus. Quality shareholders balance the base, and counteract these downsides.
As to curbing overzealous activism, QS can be white squires—a term dating to the 1980s
referring to block shareholders tending to support management.30 When a board perceives activist
excess, it helps to have a few large long-term owners to consult. As a united front, the company’s
hand is strengthened, resisting excess while addressing legitimate concerns activist may have.31
Quality shareholders study company specifics which indexers, being stretched thin,
cannot.32 Indexers may be good at analyzing dynamic issues as they arise, but rarely develop deep
knowledge that QS command. Indexers invest most of their limited resources to develop views
about what is best generally in corporate governance, not what is best for particular companies.
Quality shareholders differ from both activists and indexers regarding director elections.
Activists nominate directors, fellow board members often resist, and indexers almost never
nominate directors at all. QS offer a supply of outstanding directors for their investees, often
themselves.33
Being long-term, QS offset the short-term preferences of transients. A high density of QS,
with their characteristic patience, helps managers operate strategically, with a long-term outlook.34
Such effects can percolate throughout a company. If less pressure comes from shareholders to
produce short-term results, then directors, officers, employees, suppliers, strategic partners and
others can operate in the same manner.35
Shareholder cohorts have different preferences about the price levels of stocks they own.
Transients generally prefer the highest price possible for maximum profit on immediate sale;
indexers favor the highest reasonable price because they assume, consistent with efficient market
theory, that price and value are substantially the same; and QS, generally uninterested in an
immediate sale and attune to stock market volatility, prefer a stock price that bears the most rational
relationship possible to the company’s intrinsic business value.36 (At purchase, of course, QS seek
prices below value.)37
Many managers tend to likewise prefer the highest possible stock price, perceiving it as a

30

See supra text accompanying note 27.

31

See James Woolery, Rob Leclerc & Richard Fields, The Ashland-Cruiser Proxy Contest—A Case
Study, HARV. GOV. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2019).
32

See infra Part III for aspects of the related debate.

33

See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2 (Chapter 3).

34

See Brian L. Connelly, Laszlo Tihanyi, S. Trevis Certo & Michael A. Hitt, Marching to the Beat
of Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions, 53 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. (2010) (finding positive association between high density of quality shareholders and strategic
management decision making).
35

CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2 (chapter 3).

36

See WARREN E. BUFFETT & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT:
LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA (5th ed. 2019) 38.
37

BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR.
8

measure of their own performance, the higher the better.38 But while they often complain that their
company’s stock price is too low, under- and over-pricing are equally likely and neither is
desirable.39
A share price that is rationally related to business value can be a huge asset for several
purposes, including making acquisitions, compensating employees, and facilitating fairly priced
gains (or losses) when shareholders must sell.40 While there is a lively debate over the degree of
such market efficiency—of how well price approximates value—companies with the closest
nexus enjoy clear advantages over those with the widest gaps. Evidence suggests that companies
with ownership dominated by QS tend to enjoy stock prices that are less volatile and more
rationally related to business value.41
Above all, a company’s shareholder mix can influence corporate behavior and
performance. Patient shareholders invite managers to invest in long-term projects promising high
returns on invested capital; short-term traders stimulate activities that translate into increases in
quarterly earnings per share. Shareholders with large stakes relative to the rest of a company’s
shares determine the level of managerial accountability through majoritarian voting traditions.
Those with large stakes relative to their other investments tend to be more engaged, epitomized by
hedge fund activists.
There is a correlation between stock price performance and QS density. For instance, in
related research, I first identified the leading QS measured by patience and concentration during
the five-year period from 2014-2018 and used that to identify the companies that attract this cohort
in the highest density over that period.42 Then I compared a portfolio comprised of the 25
companies at the top of the QS density and 25 companies at the bottom of the QS density. The
high QS density portfolio outperformed the low QS density portfolio in each of the five years.
There is also evidence that the patient-concentrated strategy associated with QS can enable
this cohort to outperform investment markets systematically. Conventional wisdom—and
considerable research—challenged claims that individual stock picking strategies can
systematically outperform index benchmarks, at least after fees.43 However, changes in

38

See BARUCH LEV, WINNING INVESTORS OVER: SURPRISING TRUTHS ABOUT HONESTY,
EARNINGS GUIDANCE, AND OTHER WAYS TO BOOST YOUR STOCK PRICE 103-105 (2014).
39

Id.

See BUFFETT & CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS, supra note 36, at 38 (Berkshire’s owner-related
business principles, number 14).
40

41

See Paul Borochin & Jie Yang, The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm Valuation
and Governance, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 171 (2017) (including a robust propensity score model for identify
quality shareholders). Other recent research affirms other advantages that long-term investors

contribute to companies they invest in. See Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality
Shareholders(footnote citing Jarrad Hartford etc.)
42

Lawrence A. Cunningham, Quality Outperforms: Evidence on Portfolios of Companies with
Relative Densities of Quality Shareholders (draft in circulation summer/fall 2020).
43

See Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund
Performance, 65 J. FIN. 915 (2010) (while some managers are skilled, few deliver on that value for
customers after fees); Mark Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57 (1997)
9

shareholder demographics during the past two decades, including increased competition and lower
fees, produced a new strand of research challenging these conventional views.44
For instance, there is evidence that the average active fund does outperform an equivalent
index;45 some top-performance records do persist;46 and a sizable cohort of managers with
particular traits demonstrate skill that covers their fees.47 Among those traits are conviction and

II. CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS
The shareholder cultivation literature extensively discusses communications strategies as
ways to sculpt a shareholder base. The tendency is to orient disclosure toward attracting long-term
shareholders. There is substantial criticism of short-term reporting, especially against quarterly
earnings reports, forecasts and calls.48 After all, disclosure focused on short-term goals in
disclosure may attract short-term biased investors.49 The literature notes the potential for securities
regulations to backfire in this regard, when prescribing increased disclosure that overemphasizes
short-term horizons.50
More generally, the shareholder cultivation literature on disclosure portrays proxy
statements and other formal communications as an opportunity to educate shareholders.51 Related
messaging can be tailored as much as possible to attract or repel shareholders defined in various
ways, whether time horizon, relative concentration, or otherwise. That includes the relative
appetite for socially oriented investors who would find ESG-based integrated reporting
appealing.52
Financial disclosure can serve in the same way. Managers who provide the numbers that
really matter, rather than just generic earnings metrics, are likely to attract shareholders with an
analytical appetite.53
(finding that the empirical evidence did “not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund
portfolio managers”).
44 See Martijn

Cremers, Jon Fulkerson & Timothy B. Riley, Challenging the Conventional Wisdom
on Active Management: A Review of the Past 20 Years of Academic Literature on Actively Managed Mutual
Funds, 75 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 8 (2019).
45
Jonathan Berk & Jules van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry, 118 J. FIN.
ECON. (2015); Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Mutual Funds in Equilibrium, 9 ANN. REV.
FIN. ECON. 147 (2017); Hyunglae Jeon, Jangkoo Kang & Changjun Lee, Precision About Manager Skill,
Mutual Fund Flows, and Performance Persistence, 40 N. AM. J. ECON. FIN. 222 (2017).
46
Nicolas Bollen & Jeffrey Busse, Short-term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 18 REV.
FIN. STUD. 569 (2005); Robert Kowoski, Allan Timmermann, Russ Wermers & Hal White, Can Mutual
Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551 (2006).
Yakov Amihud & Ruslan Goyenko, Mutual Fund’s R2 as Predictor of Performance, 26 REV.
FIN. STUD. 667 (2013); Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager? A New
Measure that Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329 (2009).
47

48

Dallas, supra note 8, at 560; Rock, supra note 3, at 870.
Rodrigues, supra note 6, at 1850.
50
Id.
51
Rock, supra note 3, at 870.
52
Belinfanti, supra note 4, at 856.
53
Hu, supra note 7, at 403.
49

10

While the shareholder cultivation literature’s treatment of communications strategies is
accordingly rich, this Part fortifies it in numerous ways. First, it treats two topics the literature has
almost entirely overlooked: annual meetings and shareholder letters, of particular interest not
merely to the long-term shareholder but to the concentrated one. Second, it reorients two topics—
the quarterly communications and reporting accounting information—as corollaries and presents
a third topic—stock splits—as a corporate communications strategy, being a signal about
managerial expectations rather than, as conventionally presented, part of dividend policy. In each
case, the discussion includes historical context along with contemporary utility.
A. Annual Meetings
At most companies, the annual meeting is a perfunctory affair, with a two-hour meeting
considered lengthy.54 While time is usually allotted for shareholder questions, the “questions”
often seem more like pet peeves than probes of company strategy and prospects. Those responding
tend to focus narrowly or literally on the particular questions, rather than listening for clues about
wider shareholder concerns that create opportunities to educate shareholders about the company’s
strategy and prospects.
But it doesn’t have to be that way, and scores of companies buck the boring approach, in
part to entice QS. They offer videos, product samples, lengthy Q&As, educational programs, and
more. In a few cases, additional events surround the meeting, such as separate meetings of major
subsidiaries or breakout sessions with key managers. As New Yorker columnist John Brooks
reported, annual meetings “bring companies to life.”55 QSs relish this.
1. History. Before the 1930s, annual shareholder meetings were perfunctory legal affairs
that achieved little and attracted few. Amid rising individual share ownership, a vocal group of
gadflies, led by the brothers John and Lewis Gilbert, spent the next four decades making meetings
matter.
By the early 1960s across corporate America, up to ten annual meetings drew more than
1,000; two dozen between 300 and 900; and AT&T, boasting millions of shareholders, set the era’s
record at 12,000 attendees. A 1964 New York Times story proclaimed: “the vociferous minority
shareholders helped popularize meetings by their persistent attendance and their keen questioning
on controversial matters.”
In the early 1970s, a movement to abandon the annual meeting flickered fleetingly. In
1972, Delaware, leading state of incorporation for public companies, updated its law to let
shareholders act by written consent rather than at meetings. In a New York Times op-ed, J.B. Fuqua,
of Fuqua Industries, advocated for abolition, in favor of voting by mail.
But shareholders overwhelmingly pushed back and stock exchanges ruled that the consent
method did not meet their requirement to have an annual meeting. By 1975, the abolition
movement was dead, wryly judged by The New York Times as “notably unsuccessful.”
That same year, Warren Buffett began building what would become the most popular
annual shareholder meeting, at Berkshire Hathaway. In 1975, a dozen attended in an Omaha office
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cafeteria, but then for the next three decades added a digit—hundreds by 1985, thousands by 1995,
and tens of thousands by 2005. In 2018, more than 40,000 attended, the record for a U.S. public
company.
While the Berkshire meeting’s main feature has long been a six-hour Q&A with Buffett
and vice chairman Charlie Munger, it has evolved into a long-weekend extravaganza. The
company for decades has hosted events on the days surrounding the meeting—a Friday night ball
game, Saturday evening cookout, Sunday champagne brunch—and shareholders have added their
own conferences, panels, and parties that alone draw hundreds or thousands. It is a series of
energetic scenes of engaged QSs.56
Markel Corporation hosts an impressive annual meeting in its hometown of Richmond,
Virginia—but also hosts a separate gathering, drawing some 1,300 shareholders in Omaha during
the weekend of the Berkshire meeting. Detecting overlap in both shareholders and values, CEO
Tom Gayner began the tradition in 1985, when he was a junior insurance manager. A half dozen
joined him. Gayner has continued to lead the event since.
2. Evolution. From 1980 through 2010, ownership of public company equity shifted from
individuals to institutions. With that shift, companies increasingly communicated to shareholders
throughout the year, always at regular quarterly intervals and often more frequently, approaching
a model of continuous disclosure.
While ownership and communication changed, the annual meeting remained a staple of
corporate life, an important opportunity for shareholders— both individuals and representatives of
institutions—to meet management, pose questions, press issues and resolve debate.
But if the prior era’s annual meetings stressed individual shareholders and associated
“democratic” rights, this one increasingly brought out corporate identity and culture. For example,
Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, from 1984 until its sale to Unilever in 2000, attracted a crew of socially
responsible owners to a meeting that looked more like Woodstock than Wall Street.
Held among cattle farms near Burlington, Vermont, the founders ran the meeting
informally, weaving in the vocabulary of hippies: Jerry Greenfield, one of the founders, might
intone, “Hey, man, time for a little Q&A.” If Ben Cohen made a motion, in unison a chorus could
be heard paraphrasing Smokey Robinson, singing “I second that motion.”57
The company’s commitment to sustainable profitability, and social responsibility through
charitable giving, resonated with this group. Pressed by critics on board authority to allocate
corporate profits to charitable causes, Ben Cohen, Greenfield’s partner, explained:
We’ve never taken a formal vote of all the shareholders, but at our annual meetings,
I usually ask them—just a show of hands, it’s nonbinding—if they support the
company’s supporting the community and giving away what are really their profits.
And they’re all in favor of it.
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The Ben & Jerry’s annual meeting helped to communicate the company’s brand, attracting both
consumers and like-minded shareholders, forging enduring loyalties. Moreover, it was achieved at
low cost and produced high returns.
Another mighty American town, Fayetteville, Arkansas, has been the scene of the Walmart
stockholders’ meeting, most distinctive because of its conscious focus on employees, many of
whom are also shareholders. Founder Sam Walton hosted the first Walmart Stores annual meeting
in 1970 at a coffee shop with five other people. Since the 1980s, the meetings have added special
events and celebrity guests drawing large crowds. The venue has moved from the headquarters
auditorium to University of Arkansas arenas now seating 20,000.
Walmart executives bound onto stage under flashes of light, met with roars of crowd
approval. Managers get the crowd to spell out Walmart, declare that the store is “number one” and
proclaim their love of the brand. Though Walmart remains an economic powerhouse serving its
shareholders well, its identity is in its employees, whom it affectionately calls “associates.” The
annual meeting is their centerpiece.
The annual meeting can be a place where shareholders see the human face of a company
and its culture. They meet the chairman, operating and executive teams, and even the board.
During his tenure at DuPont, CEO and chairman, Chad Holliday, would wander up and down the
aisles, shaking hands with shareholders in a show of savvy but human leadership.58 Directors
usually attend shareholders meeting and are introduced to the crowd. In some cases, they are asked
to play additional roles, from serving as emcee to introducing themselves and given their
backgrounds.
At some annual meetings, companies offer freebies to shareholders, as at Tootsie Roll.
Product samples from Ben & Jerry’s ice cream are given out at Unilever meetings, box lunches
are served at Marks & Spencer and British Petroleum.59 These gestures keep those attending happy
and entices their return. Successful shareholder meetings tend to draw more people every year—
as a company prospers and word spreads.
3. Future. Executives who have perfected the practice of the live annual meeting may have
a competitive advantage as companies migrate to the virtual approach, both voluntarily and thanks
to the coronavirus that drove almost annual meetings to virtual format from the second quarter of
2020.
Authorization to host virtual-only shareholder meetings was first enacted in 2000 by
Delaware corporate law. Today, most state corporate laws permit the practice as well.60 In the first
decade, a smattering of smaller companies opted in. During this period, a few big names publicly
evaluated the virtual-only option. Among these, a half dozen opted against doing so after hearing
negative feedback from shareholders, while another half dozen went forward, despite negative
feedback.
Notably, the companies who went forward tend to enjoy a relatively higher QS density than
those pulling back. Among those adhering to live meetings are several in the top quarter in
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attracting QSs: Conoco Phillips, Symantec and Union Pacific. Among those who went virtual yet
remain adept at attracting QSs: Comcast, Duke Energy, Intel, and PayPal.61
Proponents cite several advantages for virtual-only shareholder meetings, which opponents
counter. Advantages are lower costs, potentially increasing the number of shareholders tuning in,
and a cost-benefit framework that stresses that few attend and little occurs. Opponents counter that
such features are not inevitable, as many managers have harnessed the shareholder meeting as a
productive forum for all. Poor turnout and banality are managers’ fault and more a sign of a
problem to be fixed than a rationale for further dilution, critics say.
Another general argument holds that institutional owners cannot attend all the meetings
where they own stock because their portfolios are so diversified, and having the ability to tune-in
increases coverage. This argument may be especially compelling for indexers owning stock in
hundreds or thousands of companies without the staff to attend most of them. But this seems more
a critique of indexing than of live meetings. In any event, at current staffing levels of indexers,
they would not be able to attend a great many meetings even if all were virtual.
But whatever relative appeal exists in the merits of live versus virtual meetings, the
pandemic reality warrants increased investment in the quality of virtual meetings. For the sake of
attracting QS, the virtual event remains the sole opportunity for managers and directors to connect
with shareholders and shareholders to get acquainted managers and directors. Such a special
opportunity should not be overlooked.
B. Shareholder Letters
An artfully-drafted shareholder letter provides insights into a company’s values, culture,
and outlook. It is the forum of greatest freedom for CEO expression, as the letter is both optional
and unregulated. It is therefore the ideal place for the CEO to convey both individual and corporate
personality. They reassure current shareholders by reiterating corporate values, reintroducing
management personalities, and reflecting the corporate trajectory. These communications are an
excellent tool in attracting QSs.
One reason the shareholder letter provides an excellent way to cultivate quality is that so
many CEOs simply don’t bother with them—those who try have an automatic competitive
advantage. Even across companies offering such letters, only a minority of companies archive
them on their web sites. Among those that are readily accessible, analysts who have read large
samplings attest that only a handful are worth reading—fewer than three percent by one estimate.62
Scan surveys of the best shareholder letters—either a search of published materials or a
poll at an investor gathering—and the same names keep coming up. Observers, however, give high
marks to shareholder letters for different reasons.
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For example, many rankings of the “best” shareholder letters score general clarity; some
run algorithms searching for linguistic cues across the continuum from candid to obfuscating.63
Some investors view shareholders letters as a screen for prospective investments to supplement
more typical analytical filters.64
Single letters taken in isolation are less meaningful than the arc over many years. Quite a
few CEOs have written one great letter but the best keep it up year after year. Studying the letters
of a large number of companies over a long period of time yields valuable guidance for
shareholders and managers alike.
A common theme: growing into the letters. The best letters are those of the experienced
leader—outstanding executives tend to develop in the job, and get better with engagement. CEOs
should not get discouraged: writing shareholder letters can be difficult at first, but it tends to get
easier with passing years.
Many CEOs find support in the letter-writing from other members of their team. Some
CEOs share the burdens and joys of letter writing with colleagues. Yet others have gained
inspiration by making their letters into a company pitch. They target not only QSs but outline
acquisition criteria and even advertise the company’s products. As an additional opportunity, there
is no better place than the shareholder letter to include a pitch to prospective business partners and
sellers.
Another feature of outstanding letters is originality, reflecting the personality of the writer
and culture of the company. QSs know the difference between legitimate emulation and mindless
copycatting. The best letters—as with any kind of writing—are those written with sincerity and
passion. Above all, the Golden Rule of shareholder letters: Buffett says he writes to provide
shareholders information he would want to have if their “positions were reversed.”
A degree of repetition is valuable—especially on enduring core values and practices. One
endearing feature of many letters for QSs are core principles that do not change. Such a firm belief
system is valuable to QSs—whatever happens in the world, they know the company stays true to
its values. Such statements are therefore worthy of repetition.
Consistency is a virtue, especially in presenting figures and charts. As data lovers, QSs
appreciate substantial historical figures. Many shareholder letters feature such information, at least
a decade, some going back multiple decades and one nearly a century (Genuine Parts Company,
from 1928).
When authors introduce new metrics and charts, they explain their utility. If omitting data
in one year that appeared previously, the writer must explain why. Readers who need to hunt to
see if goalposts have changed may instead change their views on the company’s appeal.
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One expert on the shareholder letter, Laura Rittenhouse, stresses that reading the best letters
can “boost your strategic IQ and your investment returns.” relative candor and clarity. In a recent
annual ranking, Rittenhouse designated the top 25 by her measures, the vast majority of which
rank among the highest in terms of attracting QS. Table 5-B lists these 20 companies.65
C. Quarterly Reticence
While quarterly conference calls have been a staple of corporate life for decades, as
structured today they are not congenial forums to draw many QSs or communicate useful
information. When held for the purpose of providing quarterly forecasts, they can pose serious
side-effects. They can make CFOs resemble gold rush prospectors in Mark Twain’s definition of
a mine: “a mine is a hole in the ground with a liar standing over it.” Therefore, many companies
are considering alternatives. Let’s review the debate.
1. Forecasts. Begin with the quarterly forecast. For one, there is no legal requirement that
companies publicly predict upcoming performance. The practice of providing “quarterly
guidance” began to spread in the 1980s and 1990s after decades when such forecasting was
illegal.66 Securities laws forbade prognostications for several reasons, primarily that such
predictions are given undue credence and create perverse incentives to reach them.
Once permitted, forecasting proliferated, largely in response to appetites of financial
analysts. They are genuinely hungry for analytical grist such guidance provides, as it helps them
make their own forecasts.
While proponents of quarterly forecasting continue to assert that more management
reporting is an inexorable good, that group is becoming the minority. Most observers now
recognize that the drawbacks of quarterly management forecasts far outweigh the benefits.
First, even if more information might generally be better (contestable, given today’s
information overload), forecasts are not information. They are predictions and guesses. Given the
vicissitudes of business, no one can be highly confident in them, no matter how carefully
developed.
No business operates in a predictable environment and most face considerable volatility
risk. Take examples from two very different industries showing the many risk factors that come
into play. A shipping company must worry about docking and repairing vessels, moving deepwater drilling rigs, responding to hurricanes, and cleaning up oil spills; a media company must
work through news cycles, election waves, sporting events, and financial gyrations.67
Second, it takes enormous time and effort to develop quarterly estimates, diverting
managerial resources from other important business. Three-month forecasts draw attention and
focus to current quarterly outcomes, away from ensuing quarters, years, or decades. As the
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managers at Loews quipped “we attach a much greater priority to generating superior stock price
performance over the next twelve years than over any single twelve-month period.”68
Third, quarterly estimates become both goals and a test. Internal goal-setting is necessary
to measure and motivate managers. But by publicizing forecasts, managers strive for those targets
instead, creating perverse incentives.
Finally, a quarterly focus tempts imprudent spending cuts.69 At Unilever, for instance, such
a focus led to reducing research, technology and investments. This form of earnings management
can have disastrous effects, from distorting internal decision making to snowballing into
accounting irregularities or even financial fraud.
Recent trends point to a decline in quarterly forecasting. As few as one in five public
companies maintains the practice, many out of sheer habit, though there has been a modest uptick
in the percentage in recent years.70
Yet even if convinced by proponents, one thing is clear: QSs oppose quarterly guidance.
They prefer managers to focus on the long-term economics of a business, not short-run accounting
results.
None of this is to say that quarterly results do not matter. Often, they matter a great deal,
which is why law requires public companies to publish quarterly results. It’s also why some
companies, while skipping guidance, nevertheless still host quarterly conference calls. The key
point, however, is to avoid letting quarterly events—reports, calls, or guidance—replace long-term
thinking.
A recent study found that companies who quit forecasting came to attract a larger
proportion of long-term institutional investors.71 Quitting may be difficult over the short-term, and
those trying to stop face resistance and sometimes even a decline in average ensuing share price.
But the long-term advantages are strong.
3. Calls. Quarterly conference calls pose similar challenges to quarterly guidance. For one,
again, neither logic nor law requires such calls. They became staples of corporate life as the forum
to provide and update quarterly forecasts. Quarterly gatherings pose most of the problems that
guidance does, though perhaps of smaller magnitude.
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But there are potential benefits of hosting a quarterly huddle. Shareholders may have valid
questions throughout the year worth addressing between annual meetings. Managers may benefit
from hearing those and thinking them through using a shareholder perspective. In principle, it
should be possible to arrange such gatherings while keeping short-term pressures in check. One
step would schedule them as far away from publication of quarterly results as possible, rather than
as close, which seems to be the common pattern.
Prudence would limit discussion to past performance and strategic outlooks, rather than
forecasting results. It would be a forum where executives educate shareholders to understand the
business. Managers would reference recent results as briskly as possible, then focus on big-picture,
long-term goals, like successful product launches, opening new markets, and gaining market share.
There are other issues with the current quarterly conference call. Despite regulatory efforts
dating back two decades to assure access to all shareholders on these calls (“Regulation FD”), they
remain dominated by financial analysts whose firms specialize in selling securities, with QSs in
the quiet minority. While some analyst questions add value, many follow-ups do not, and while
answers sometimes seem useful, many seem guarded or superficial or simply reference published
materials.
Technology is also being used to erode the value of the quarterly conference call. Highfrequency traders use artificial intelligence to conduct sentiment analysis while calls are in
progress. The procedure interprets the call’s tone and messaging in real-time and directs instant
trading decisions throughout the session. The goal is to profit from a few seconds worth of
“advance knowledge.”
4. Better Ways. For managers and shareholders who hope to stay connected and engaged
year-round there are a number of alternatives. The two most common alternatives are direct
meetings and written questions; less common are formal shareholder liaisons.
Companies are increasingly turning away from quarterly calls in favor of the periodic
written Q&A. Companies invite shareholders to email written questions, managers prepare
responses, and all are posted at times calculated to minimize any market effects. Posts are indexed
and searchable on company websites.
An online Q&A can address questions from any source, not only shareholders, so long as
the source is disclosed. For instance, executives might scour reliable internet sites, such as Reddit,
to address the most frequently posed questions. To be more proactive, a company could crowd
source questions from shareholders.
Some companies are willing to host direct meetings between shareholders and managers
or even directors. Securities laws limit the scope of company disclosure to public information
(under Regulation FD, if nonpublic information is disclosed to one shareholder it must be
disclosed to all). But that still leaves ample room for productive talk.
Shareholders may be interested in engaging with independent directors, which can be
conveniently done around the time of the annual meeting over lunch or dinner. Take care that
directors interacting with shareholders are trained to know the scope of information that is
allowable for discussion under securities laws. If there is any doubt, they should err on the side of
silence. The boundaries should be delineated to the attending shareholders ahead of time.
Veterans of the process suggest a few guidelines, with varying degrees of flexibility
designed to promote productive exchange rather than straitjacket the initiative: (1) a stated policy
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concerning timing, topics, and shareholder participants; (2) a set of criteria to determine which
directors participate; (3) an outline of goals or objectives for the gatherings; (4) coordination
between directors and executives; and (5) legal compliance standards to avoid impermissible
disclosures.72
Such discussions highlight shareholder concerns as well as reiterate what attracted them to
the company in the first place. Shareholders size up directors and vice versa. Conversation helps
identify areas of contentment as well as room for improvement.
Whether to engage should be in the discretion of directors. Many energetically oppose the
idea, while others are game. Opponents see the outreach as investor relations, not the board’s job;
supporters see it as part of corporate governance, where the director-shareholder relationship is
central. Likewise, some CEOs will support the outreach while others recoil at the prospect.
For those interested in a more formal and routinized approach, a shareholder liaison
committee can appeal. Common among large listed French companies, these representatives
regularly meet with the board of directors. On their websites, companies such as BNP Paribas and
Air Liquide publish the names of the liaison committees and topics of discussion. They state that
any shareholder can become a candidate for the committee, whose members typically serve threeyear terms.
Board meeting agendas occasionally include time for the shareholder liaison committee.
Ground rules vary: the one-way approach permits the board to ask the shareholders questions but
not vice versa whereas the two-way invites dialogue. The exchange of ideas can be productive,
and certainly to research and act on questions concerning shareholders. While QS regard quarterly
guidance and forecasts as unnecessary, a dialogue is always valuable.
D. Accounting Information
Financial reporting offers numerous alternative snapshot figures to portray business
performance and condition. Among alternative performance metrics are economic profit, book
value, and return on equity or invested capital. QSs appreciate explanations for which is
preferred—and also insist on consistency in sticking with the same measure over the years, not
picking and choosing depending on which looks best in any given year.
Consistency is important because, at almost any company in any given year, there is almost
always a metric out there which can portray positive results. metrics portray something positive.
Choosing the assertions that provide silver linings is tempting—better accounts receivable
turnover despite sluggish sales, faster inventory turns despite production problems, reduced debt
despite greater reduction in equity.
Companies attract and keep QSs by having the courage to report the same items about the
same core sources of value creation year in and year out, whether positive, negative or neutral.
QSs want the entire picture. Whatever metric is chosen, the methodology and rationale must be
explained.
Economic profit is an example, of great appeal to QS. It is an honest picture of
performance, taking into account multiple factors, including the cost of equity capital. One of the
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pioneers of using economic profit was Roberto Goizueta, CEO of The Coca-Cola Company. He
began using this measure in 1993, as reported in his ensuing 1994 letter to shareholders, presenting
this is as a central performance metric:
We now evaluate our business units and opportunities based primarily on
their ability to generate attractive economic profit, not just growth in revenues or
earnings. We define economic profit as net operating profit after taxes, less a charge
for the average cost of the capital employed to produce that profit. That shift in
evaluation methodology prompted us to begin divesting ourselves of businesses
with financial characteristics inferior to the remarkable fundamentals of our core
soft drink business.
Companies who take economic profit seriously tend to attract QS. While only a dozen such
companies, and all but one is in the top third of companies measured by relative density of QSs.
Besides Coca-Cola and Credit Acceptance, these companies include Clorox, Crown Holdings,
International Flavors, and Lear Corporation.73
1. Perspectives and Adjusted Metrics. It is the rare corporate executive who believes that
thoroughgoing compliance with GAAP (or IFRS) produces a faithful economic statement of
performance and results. That’s why virtually all managers supplement their reports with adjusted
and alternative metrics that, they believe, more faithfully reflect economic reality, whether
economic profit or any of dozens of other refinements.
While managers must explain the accounting results, most QSs also appreciate
accounting’s inherent limitations. They welcome a CEO’s analysis of supplemental metrics and
particularly the CEO’s views of how the economics differ from the accounting.
The need for adjusted metrics and analysis may be isolated to a one-time event or may
recur, spanning from a single acquisition to debate over annual amortization of intangibles. The
shareholder letter is an excellent place to explain the company’s and CEO’s view, ideally in plain
enough language for general understanding.
Perhaps the most recurring challenge in accounting, and its relation to economics, is the
difference between accounting earnings and various formulations of economic earnings, such as
EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization). While volumes are
devoted to this topic, CEOs must explain the specific thinking of how these measures fit the
company’s particular circumstances.
Berkshire supplements its reports with a concept Buffett calls “owner earnings” for its
acquired businesses, rather than rely solely on GAAP operating earnings or cash flow. Cash flows
are commonly calculated as (a) GAAP operating earnings plus (b) depreciation expense and other
non-cash charges.

73

The assertions in this paragraph are based on a search of all 10K reports from 1996 through 2018.
The term “economic profit” appeared 641 times, in filings of some 200 different companies. Limiting the
search to those companies with at least seven instances, twenty companies appeared—half continuing to
use the term through the present and the other half using it having ceased using it at some point in the recent
past. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2.

20

But Buffett’s owner earnings calculation subtracts one element: (c) required reinvestment
in the business, or “the average amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment, etc.,
that the business requires to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit volume.”
Given how common it is for (c) to exceed (b), Buffett’s metric is a more useful
approximation of economic reality than typical cash flow or GAAP earnings figures. Most
importantly, Buffett has consistently provided this information and explained the reasoning behind
it.
2. Warning. Despite the utility of non-GAAP measures, some managers and accountants
abuse the opportunity in order to paint false impressions. An age-old problem, deception through
non-GAAP reporting became widespread during the 1990s. Lynn Turner, then SEC chief
accountant, famously quipped that using non-GAAP measures turned many financial reports into
BS—Turner dubbed it “everything but the bad stuff.” The pervasive problem was a factor in the
accounting scandals that prompted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which told the SEC to regulate
the practice.
In response, the SEC’s Regulation G has since required companies using non-GAAP
measures to reconcile them to the nearest GAAP measure. Also banned were a variety of
misleading practices that had become all too common, such as excluding various categories of
expenses. Even so, non-GAAP reporting remained a fraud risk factor, prompting the SEC since
2013 to police the practice more pro-actively. Over ensuing years, non-GAAP reporting has drawn
a substantial volume of SEC comment letters to issuers.74
One clue is the invention of novel definitions of profit that myopically ignore “bad stuff.”
While sometimes these are specific to a particular company, the most pernicious practices become
widespread across an industry or sector. For example, consider contribution margin. This purports
to show selling price per unit less variable costs per unit—ignoring fixed costs. While potentially
useful internally to manage a business, fixed costs cannot be ignored.
Critics pounced on such tools embraced by companies such as Peleton Interactive, Shake
Shack, Uber, and WeWork’s parent to exempt expenses such as rent, marketing and stock option
pay.75 At ride-sharing companies they called it “core platform contribution profit.” It reversed out
expenses that, while necessary to operate the business and therefore real, did not connect to the
“core platform.”76
At WeWork’s office leasing business, for example, GAAP net income was negative. Under
a notion called “community-adjusted” earnings, however, a profit was shown by ignoring a variety
of necessary outlays. For one, GAAP accounting for leases requires recognizing an expense on a
straight-line basis over a lease term; but some of WeWork’s leases gave it rent discounts in the
earlier years of the lease. Wishing to present the economics only of those early years, it opted to
exclude future rent expense. That’s myopic, not illuminating.
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Managers interested in attracting QS present reliable and useful financial information.
They do not play games with the numbers or their investors. QS are alert to the difference between
analytical tools and legerdemain, between genuine and fakes, and between the trustworthy and the
charlatan.
E. Stock Price and Stock Splits
Stock price levels are largely outside the control of corporate issuers, though historically
boards often influenced the level through devices such as splitting the stock (dividing each share
into multiple shares with corresponding price reductions per share) or combining it (called a
reverse stock split, combining multiple shares with corresponding price increases per share).
The shareholder cultivation literature explored how such decisions could sculpt the
shareholder base. According to Professor Rock, stock splits can be used to attract individual
shareholders if offered when there are high investor valuations on the firms.77 Low stock prices
may attract investors who buy for non-value reasons—perhaps short-term investors seek to profit
from erratic price swings. He noted that such effects may be countered by corporate
communications stressing long-term prospects.78
The shareholder cultivation literature concerning stock price and stock splits warrants
updating to account not only for focusing on QS but also in light of contemporary developments
affecting the practice of stock splits.
Splitting the stock means turning a single share into two or three shares. This increases the
number of shares outstanding, proportionally cuts the value allocable to each, and drives per share
price down accordingly. Splits do not change the company’s total value or per share value but
only carve the corporate pie into more slices.
Historically, stock splits were common and per share prices rarely exceeded $100. The
traditional rationales for splitting the stock, and thereby cutting the per share price, were to expand
the pool of potential buyers and increase market liquidity. At the time, however, stocks had to be
traded in even lots of 100 or additional fees applied. So pricey stocks translated into large dollar
order sizes—out of reach for many.
But there have always been downsides to stock splits. Side-effects often include increasing
the market capitalization, despite no change in fundamentals. Yes, the aggregate post-split price
(the lower price times the greater number of shares) may rise and end up greater than the total presplit price, an irrational response attributed to market perceptions that splits signal managerial
belief in prosperity ahead. While appealing to those preferring a high price no matter what, it’s
unappealing to QSs, who prefer a price rationally related to value.
Today, with the advent of on-line trading, single shares trade without fee premiums,
making low per share prices less important to individual investors. If the old-fashioned rationale
for splits was to entice investors with stronger appetites for more affordable price ranges, that
reasoning diminished greatly in a world dominated by indexers, which buy stocks without regard
to price. Moreover, institutional investors, especially index funds who trade in significant volumes
without regard to price, oppose the increased costs associated with lower-priced shares.
The financial crisis of 2008 also fostered changing attitudes on the optics of relative share
prices. Whereas a low price was previously portrayed as signaling pending prosperity, post-crisis,
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a high price became a sign of success. That was particularly true at the depths of the crisis, when
pervasive low-pricing was a stigma to be overcome, not a sign of good times ahead.
For all these reasons, while stock splits were frequent in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
popularity has ebbed. From 2014 to 2019, fewer than 60 splits occurred among S&P 500
companies, for instance.79
That said, there are valid substantive reasons for splitting a stock. A common one is to
make it easier for shareholders to give gifts of their shares to family or charitable organizations. A
stockholder owning shares trading at multiples of an intended gift size is handcuffed. Splitting the
stock to low prices facilitates splicing the gift as the shareholder may desire.
Another valid reason is when a company uses its stock to pay for an acquisition. A highdollar stock may exceed the value of shares held by some selling shareholders, especially
employees owning small stakes, who would otherwise be cashed out. Their interest in remaining
stockholders can be accommodated by splitting the stock to a lower price.
For example, if Company A, with a $1000 stock price, pays shares to buy Company B,
with a $50 stock price, any Company B stockholders owning fewer than 20 shares would be paid
cash in lieu of fractional shares. This situation arose when Berkshire Hathaway acquired BNSF
Railway in 2010. It was one reason Berkshire split its class B shares (50-for-1) to enable more
BNSF employees to continue to own more of their employer’s stock.80
An elite group of companies have avoided splitting the stock as price has run to four digits
and more. Alphabet, having gone public (as Google) in 2004 at around $100 per share, has never
split its stock, even as it rose above $600 in 2011 and twice that as of this writing. This club of
four-figure stocks has few members: Amazon, Booking, Markel, NVR, Seaboard and White
Mountains Insurance. Berkshire’s class A shares take the cake with a six-figure share price.
All these companies, not incidentally, rank very high in QS density.81 While causation
cannot be shown, the philosophy reflected by not splitting pervades the companies, so this cannot
be dismissed as mere coincidence.
A small number of companies boast three-digit share prices—in 2019, there were 37 S&P
500 stocks priced at $250 per share or more. Again, there is a positive association between highpriced stocks and a high-density of QS. Among the highest price three-digit stocks are the
following, all of which rank in the top third in terms of attracting QS: AutoZone, Equinix, Intuitive
Surgical, Mettler-Toledo, and TransDigm.82
There is an association between companies with the highest price stocks and high QS
density. For instance, among the 100 highest priced shares in the S&P 500, more than 1/3 are in
the highest decile for QS density and well more than ½ are in the top quarter. Among the names
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appearing at the top of both lists: American Tower, Avalon Bay, McCormick, Roper, Stryker, and
Thermo Fisher Scientific.83
While stock splits may once have been useful cultivation tools, as suggested in the
literature, those days are largely gone. In the case of cultivating quality, a rising stock price appeals,
rather than one cut through the optical procedure of the stock split. It remains the case, however,
that stock splits are best seen as part of a communications strategy, and the signals they send are
unlikely to resonate with QS.
III. SUBSTANCE
The shareholder cultivation literature has considered shareholder appetite for dividends,
and how corporate dividend policy may therefore shape the shareholder base. Common
conceptions hold that that older and poorer retail investors prefer high dividend yield stocks and
greet a dividend increase more favorably, but such assertions have a weak empirical
confirmation.84
The literature has investigated the tax-related aspects of dividend policy. For instance,
dividends may attract institutional investors whose dividend tax rate is lower than capital gains
tax.85 Individual investors in high tax brackets have been found to hold dividend-paying stocks.86
Accordingly, dividend policy can influence the shareholder base in terms of the mix of institutions
and individuals.87
The literature offers innovative uses of dividends. One proposal targeted to lengthening
investor time horizons would create time-weighted dividends.88 From the funds a board declares
as a dividend, payments would be proportioned to shares based on their duration of ownership by
the same shareholder.89
The literature also treats share buybacks, often to accompany discussion of dividends.
Buybacks can attract or repel a variety of shareholders depending on how they are made. They
may serve long-term shareholder interests by increasing their allocable share of the corporate pie
and related claim to earnings.90 That is at least true when the price paid is less than the company’s
inherent business value, whereas the opposite is too often true. In the case of overpayment, shorterterm shareholders gain at the expense of longer-term shareholders.91
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The otherwise robust shareholder cultivation literature, however, has tended to isolate
discussion of dividends and buybacks without connecting them to equally important issues of
capital allocation and stock market trading. Concerning capital allocation, the literature has
overlooked topics such as acquisitions and divestitures—both of great importance to QS and
warranting treatment along with dividends and buybacks.
Finally, the shareholder cultivation literature has devoted considerable attention to the topic
of stock market listing and related effects—such as liquidity, stock price and stock splits. In this
case, however, new evidence suggests that this emphasis is not warranted, at least insofar as QS
are concerned, which exhibit no preference between today’s two dominant—and highly
competitive—stock exchanges. In fairness, the earlier treatment may prove prescient, and warrants
updating, in the face of the recent creation of a new U.S. stock exchange, the Long Term Stock
Exchange.
A. Capital Allocation
Capital allocation is a technical term that denotes simply how corporate dollars are
invested. Capital can be allocated to many different ends concurrently: fortifying the balance sheet
by repaying debt or building cash reserves, funding initiatives to maintain or grow existing
businesses, making acquisitions, buying back shares, or paying dividends. QSs value strong track
records in capital allocation, measured by return on invested capital.
Table 1 presents a framework for thinking about capital allocation and to organize
discussion. It is not a directive or road map, as optimal priorities among the depicted choices will
differ among companies and managers at different times. In fact, the various uses of excess cash
are neither mutually exclusive nor sequential—funds can be optimally allocated to all uses and
priorities given to those anywhere on the chart.
Table 1 Capital Allocation Framework
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Start with a general approach to measuring capital allocation effectiveness. First, for any
given year, calculate the corporation’s average invested capital available. Begin with an estimate
of the amount of money shareholders have invested. Then, each year, update by adding net income
and the proceeds of any share issuances, subtracting any dividends, and adjusting for any
compensation paid in shares.
Thereafter, measure overall performance as a return on the average invested capital. For
example, take net income as a percentage of invested capital (ROIC), as an ultimate measure of
capital allocation effectiveness.
To maximize ROIC on an ongoing basis, measure every corporate project accordingly.
Track every allocation, including reinvestments and acquisitions, on a project-by-project basis
using conventional after-tax internal rates of return (IRRs—the rate where the net present value of
project cash flows are zero). Be sure all company personnel are trained to be familiar with this
tool. For oversight, have the board periodically set the required hurdle rate for all project types
(the minimum required IRR to green light the proposed capital allocation).
As rigorous as this sounds, beware that IRRs are complex, future oriented, and require
judgement. Managers charged with related measurement may naturally tend to overestimate. To
compensate for this, compute an additional measure of overall annual capital allocation
effectiveness. Consider one that is simpler, historical and less-judgment laden: add annual ROIC
to annual growth in organic revenue (not acquired) and compare the sum to the hurdle rate. The
tools can be adapted to all of the capital allocation opportunities presented in Table 1. Such an
approach is an excellent way to attract QSs.
1. Reinvestment. While there is fluidity to capital allocation, the first priority ought to
belong to reinvestment in current businesses to increase competitive advantage. The chief
concerns for corporate leadership and QSs are managerial rationalizations about the prospects of
such a use of capital. Managers are often optimistic, usually a desirable trait in an entrepreneur,
but not if excessive. Standard measurements, such as IRR and hurdle rates, along with related
oversight, help keep them in check.
Another aspect of reinvestment is fortifying the balance sheet. Companies need sufficient
liquidity to be prepared for economic distress as well as to take advantage of fruitful opportunities.
2. Acquisitions. For acquisitions, the capital allocation test is simple: whether the
acquisition makes current shareholders wealthier on a per-share basis. That means paying a price
less than the target company’s stand-alone value, ideally delivering an expected return (IRR) that
exceeds a preset hurdle rate.
Despite the simple test, acquisitions are a common source of capital destruction What’s
essential in this step is skepticism of optimistic scenarios, such as forecasts of value arising from
synergies or other opportunities expected to materialize post-acquisition.
Improving an acquired company’s operations post-acquisition is a source of value
creation. But managers do not always provide investors with sufficient information to evaluate
proposed acquisitions completely or objectively. They provide projections that look compelling
and business rationales that seem logical.
Yet acquisitions can be emotional, exciting managers and stoking optimism. Managers
cultivate QSs by playing down expectations from acquisitions, skipping talk of synergies and other
often-elusive veins of value. An even better one: conducting ongoing post-acquisition analysis,
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constantly updated, to compare expected IRR with actual ROIC and determining reasons for the
difference.
Another source of discipline is using cash in preference to stock to pay for acquisitions.
Using stock can inflate the price, often felt as play-money, more like poker chips than cash.
3. Share Buybacks. At least one capital allocation decision can directly improve the
quality of the shareholder base: share buybacks. When companies buy their own shares, the most
likely cohort interested in meeting the demand are transients, who by definition are prepared to
sell at all times. That automatically increases the proportion of shares held by longer term
shareholders, such as QS.
But share buybacks are only rational for shareholders if the company pays a price less than
a conservative estimate of the company’s per share intrinsic value. If so, that is prudent capital
allocation; if not, it is capital squandering.
Buybacks were uncommon through the 1970s and 1980s, as dividends were the popular
route for corporate distributions to shareholders.92 The pioneers stood out, including under Roberto
Goizueta at Coca-Cola; Larry Tisch at Loews Corporation; Henry Singleton at Teledyne; and Kay
Graham at The Washington Post Co. In that era, companies like those followed the textbook,
repurchasing shares as a capital allocation exercise, when no better alternatives existed and price
was below value.93
By the late 1990s, buybacks had become a common practice across corporate America.
Such proliferation raised a new concern: whether managers possessing superior valuation
information exploit selling shareholders when buying at a discount. To address this, managers
must provide shareholders with all relevant valuation information. Otherwise, insiders take
advantage of uninformed shareholders, confiscating their interests at pennies on the dollar—
anathema to QSs.
The advice Warren Buffett gives to investors applies equally to managers making capital
allocation decisions: be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful. The
most obvious application of this investment principle in the context of capital allocation concerns
share buybacks. Companies make errors of both commission—buying too no matter how high the
price—as well as omission—failing to buy when prices plummet.
Buybacks automatically increase earnings per share (EPS) and tend to boost stock prices.
QSs are alert to these effects and oppose managers whose buybacks are motivated by such results
rather than rational capital allocation. They are therefore skeptical of buyback formulas or quotas.
Moreover, since buybacks automatically boost EPS, if that metric is an important part of
managerial performance reviews or compensation, boards must be especially vigilant to deter
share buybacks designed to boost executive pay.
Finally, when choosing between paying a cash dividend or buying back shares, the effects
on shareholders and option holders differ greatly. Dividends increase returns to shareholders but
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decrease the value of options, while buybacks boost earnings per share and therefore increase
option value. A conflict of interest looms between what is best for managers holding options and
all other shareholders. That’s why QSs are skeptical of companies with significant executive stock
option compensation coupled with significant share buybacks. In many such cases, a better capital
allocation for shareholders would be dividends.
4. Dividends. Dividends are another capital allocation decision that can directly shape the
shareholder base. Regular dividends give shareholders a reason to stick around during troubled
patches—they can be a useful magnet that lengthens holding periods and sometimes induces taking
larger positions. This point was stressed by one of the more frenetic and diversified stock pickers,
Peter Lynch, who gained fame as both a stock picker and author.94
A small group of companies boast paying an increasing dividend over the past five decades.
A few examples, all of which are high on the list of attracting QSs: Coca-Cola, Dover, Genuine
Parts, Hormel Foods, Johnson & Johnson, and Procter & Gamble. Even sustaining regular dividend
increases for one decade is difficult, with fewer than 300 companies having managed to do so of
late.
At the other end of the spectrum are companies that have not paid dividends, either ever or
in recent memory. The reasons are mixed, running the gamut from dazzling growth opportunities
to trouble meeting bills. Whatever the direction taken, it is best for CEOs always to explain capital
allocation policy and choices in their annual shareholder letters.
5. Board Oversight. Corporate law requires that boards approve major acquisitions and
dividends, and as a practical matter to approve share buyback programs.95 Along with such
approvals, good practice dictates that the board’s principal role is setting applicable hurdle rates,
for reinvestment and acquisitions.
Companies wishing to make capital allocation a priority could revisit whether to create a
board committee with this oversight. At S&P 500 companies, boards maintain an average of four
committees, and about 1/3 include a committee on capital allocation, finance or investment.96
Charters might call for post-investment reviews on all important allocations, especially organic
growth initiatives, acquisitions, and share buybacks.
If one advantage of cultivating QS is developing relationships and potential directors,
capital allocation is an area where they can add particularly rich value. So long as a board boasts
some such expertise, and the rest of the board learns from them, there’s no need for a capital
allocation committee.
B. Separation Transactions
Conventional wisdom says that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” But often
the opposite is true, and the parts are more valuable on their own. For companies, a simple way to
capture that greater value would be to sell the higher-valued parts. While commonplace, doing so
poses adverse tax consequences that destroy rather than enhance shareholder value. Many better
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alternative approaches have been devised to solve this problem, to channel value to shareholders,
while offering the added advantage of segmenting the shareholder base and attracting QS.
Collectively called “separation” transactions, these are well-known, if exotic, structures
such as tracking stocks, public offerings of minority interests in subsidiaries, and spin-offs.
Separation transactions produce potential benefits for both the parent as well as the newlyseparated business. The parent may gain from a sharper focus on its core retained businesses—
along with improved pricing rationality of its stock—and the separated business may gain from its
new status as an autonomous entity freshly nurtured by that parent.
From the viewpoint of shaping the shareholder base, these transactions offer additional
benefits: tracking stocks can create internal business delineations to separate QSs from transients,
with QSs tied to a core business and transients to the non-core business. Spin offs of non-core
businesses can be designed to appease, deter or thwart activists. Both of these and similar other
transactions sometimes trigger screens that result in companies being excluded from major indexes
such as the S&P 500—a benefit to any companies wishing to reduce the density of indexers in
their shareholder base.
1. Trackers.97 The simplest and most obvious way to segment the shareholder base is to
create multiple tracking stocks for a single company. The technique is designed to match different
shareholder bases to different businesses, without legally separating them. For example, a business
requiring long-term R&D investment with long product cycles should attract longer-term
shareholders while one selling quotidian commodities at spot prices might attract shorter-term
shareholders.
Tracking stocks, corporate equity of a parent tied to the economic performance of a
subsidiary, were the 1984 brainchild of Georgetown University tax professor Martin D. Ginsburg,
late husband of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Prof. Ginsburg’s design, still used to this day, solved
a problem for H. Ross Perot, the colorful Texas billionaire.
In 1984, when General Motors Co. acquired Mr. Perot’s company, Electronic Data
Systems, he and his many employee-shareholders were concerned that EDS’s performance would
be lost within the GM behemoth. They wanted to ensure that superior performance of EDS would
be rewarded regardless of how the rest of GM performed, including due to the relative time
horizons of each company. The solution: the EDS group accepted shares in GM, but performance
was tied to the economics and related time horizons of EDS, aptly dubbed “Class E stock.”
Prof. Ginsburg’s invention was so effective that GM copied it the next year when acquiring
Hughes Aircraft Company—using currency dubbed GM “Class H stock.” Both trackers remained
in place for more than a decade until GM spun the companies off, distributing all GM’s stock in
them to GM shareholders to form freestanding companies. GM’s tracking stock worked well for
all concerned, especially Mr. Perot, who showed his gratitude by endowing a professorship at
Georgetown: The Martin D. Ginsburg Chair in Taxation.
The Ginsburg Model. When corporations issue stock, stockholders enjoy many rights
against that issuer; boards control the whole and owe associated duties to all stockholders; and
governments levy associated taxes. Trackers splice rights to different shareholder groups, without
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relinquishing board prerogatives or repudiating duties, while simultaneously deferring tax
consequences.
The terms of tracking stock put parental control in its board, provide mechanisms to track
the economic performance of the targeted business, and set policies for dealings between parental
units to be at arm’s-length. Boards often adopt dividend policies based on cash flows of targeted
businesses, retain power to convert tracking stock into the parent’s common (an “unwind” feature),
and pledge to redeem the stock upon the sale of the tracked business’s assets. Otherwise, tracking
stock terms are the same as the parent’s ordinary common, on matters such as voting rights and
rights upon parent liquidation, although some variation is possible.
Exact advantages of tracking stock structures vary depending on the specific features of
the various businesses and how they interact. Benefits may include offsetting tax benefits when
one business generates substantial taxable profits while another incurs substantial losses; combined
balance sheet strength equating to lower borrowing costs; immunization from antitrust laws that
might prohibit two independent businesses from coordination that is perfectly legal among
business units of the same family; and adding incentives for managers to enhance the performance
of businesses they run by compensating them in their own tracking stock.
Rise. The original tracker model, tailor-made for GM’s acquisitions, was soon adapted to
other settings. In 1991-92, U.S. Steel Corporation enjoyed synergies through common control of
such diverse subsidiaries as Delhi Group and Marathon Oil, which shared gas-processing plants
and enjoyed lower borrowing costs together than if independent. But the businesses had distinct
economics so that a tracking stock would both keep the advantages of common control while
increasing visibility into the tracked business with gains for stockholders and managers alike. The
solution worked for a decade until USX spun Marathon Oil off.
In 1995, after the government’s antitrust break-up of AT&T, US West was a regional
telephone company which also owned cable and cellular assets. Long-term investors attracted to
the stability of the telephone utility might recoil at the volatility of media assets; shorter-term
investors seeking rapid growth would have opposite tastes. Trackers satisfied the demand of each
while housing all operations under common control, harvesting related synergies. To further meet
investor tastes, the utility side would pay regular dividends as the media side would reinvest
earnings. And the arrangement could be unwound as circumstances changed: in fact, in 1998, after
synergies proved elusive, US West spun off the media business.
In the mid-1990s, the iconic investor and telecom mogul, John Malone, used trackers to
segment the economics of diverse media assets he had been acquiring for decades through
TeleCommunications Inc. (TCI). In addition to other advantages ranging from antitrust to tax,
Malone realized that cable assets along with programming, for example, were better combined
than separate from an operations perspective. Yet they featured different economic attributes.
Using tracking stocks for such businesses could translate into higher price-earnings multiples,
which can be valuable when using stock to acquire other companies.
The TCI transactions were distinct in both complexity and boldness, which drew critics.
They referenced conflicts of interest between siblings that all parent boards using trackers face.
TCI’s prospectus said as much, then simply avowed confidence in its directors’ ability to discharge
their duties. This amounted to an “implicit message of ‘trust us’,” critics said, urging such boards
to establish structural cures, such as independent committees. But no governance devices can
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resolve such problems, and one truth about trackers is that, to make them beneficial for all parties,
the parent’s board must be trustworthy.
Stumble and Fall. As QS Bill Ruane once lamented: on Wall Street, the process goes from
innovation to imitation to irrationality. The same held for trackers, as they proliferated in the late
1990s technology sector amid irrational exuberance fueling the bubble. A common theme featured
a traditional company offering trackers in an internet subsidiary: bookseller Barnes & Noble for
its e-tailing operations; The Walt Disney Company with Go.com; brokerage firm Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette for its online trading businesses, DLJdirect; and publisher Ziff-Davis for its
online operations, ZD.net.
Nearing a peak, in mid-2000 about 30 listed trackers traded—half issued during the
bubble—and several then pending were soon aborted, including for DuPont Co.'s life sciences
business, The New York Times online, and Staples.com. Others soon wound down, including at
Disney and DLJ (then owned by CSFB). While the market for tech recovered, appetite for trackers
remained dim. Although a few trackers launched in 2001 and 2002, none debuted during 2003 or
2004.
Skeptics included luminaires from the value investing world such as Columbia Business
School professor Bruce Greenwald and Wall Street Journal veteran Roger Lowenstein. They
challenged many companies’ trackers as “putting lipstick on a pig” or “rearranging deck chairs on
the Titanic.” Proponents of efficient market theory could not imagine how ownership structures
could affect the market’s valuation of businesses.
During the bubble, many companies used trackers less to solve a knotty business
problem—which could as easily be resolved by separate audited financials—than to follow frothy
markets. Many issuers lacked the compelling rationale that makes trackers suitable—operational
synergies, interdependence, tax efficiency, or acquisition opportunities. It was not enough to repeat
versions of the US West story—which had in any event faltered.
But despite the broad retreat from trackers, Malone saw them as an ideal solution for
numerous challenges he faced managing Liberty Media. By 2005, Liberty was a complex group
of diverse media assets needing simplification. Malone began by spinning off two businesses—a
collection of international media assets and a 50% stake in Discovery Communications. Still,
Liberty Media perceived continued stock market undervaluation—by as much as 70 percent.
To address these challenges, Liberty Media created trackers, Liberty Interactive (LINTA)
and Liberty Capital (LCAPA). LINTA was anchored by Liberty’s 98% interest in QVC, the
television shopping channel and strong cash generator, and included the company’s 22% interest
in Expedia, the online travel agency, and 22% stake in IAC, owner of such companies as Ask
Jeeves and Ticketmaster.
LCAPA would house all other assets, including, as the prospectus explained, “video
programming and communications technology and services involving cable, satellite, the Internet
and other distribution media as they evolve”—in other words, anything telecom related. These
assets included a variety of businesses and securities, such as the wholly-owned Starz and On
Command; the partly owned FUN; and public equity in Motorola, News Corp., Sprint, and Time
Warner—the latter accompanied by a variety of complex hedging instruments.
Liberty thus created two sets of assets of appeal to different types of investors. Those who
favored predictable cashflows from QVC and other straightforward stalwarts would be more
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attracted to LINTA; those wanting to bet on Malone’s record of buying and selling a variety of
diverse media assets and financial hedging transactions could gravitate towards LCAPA.
When trackers increase a company’s aggregate valuation, that strengthens a company’s
hand in acquisitions it pays for using stock. For Liberty Media, this proved valuable by 2008 in
the depths of the financial crisis, when LCAPA acquired satellite radio operator SiriusXM. With
a total return exceeding 38 times its initial investment (to date), this is among the most successful
investments of the century, outdoing even those famously executed during the crisis by Warren
Buffett.
Critics would say that if parent stock is undervalued, a board can intensify buyback
programs until corrected, and if a company is too complex, it should be simplified. On the other
hand, Liberty had tried both buybacks and spin-offs but undervaluation persisted. Costs of the
tracking structure include internal managerial resources to design and implement it, along with
external costs of educating analysts and investors on the rationales. But these costs are not great
and, if the program fails, it can readily be unwound, also at modest incremental cost.
The issue came down to a venerable debate, whether trackers are mere financial
engineering—in the purely negative sense of doing nothing to increase underlying fundamental
value—or a financial achievement that increases value by deftly combining assets to cater to
differing investor appetites while maintaining economic efficiency. Given the dot.com experience,
the verdict for almost all companies was in, but for Malone and Liberty Media, the jury was out.
After all, the same critical logic would denounce spinoffs yet history proves their value—
and, for that matter, the dot.com era aside, history had proven the value of trackers, as the
McKinsey study showed. Today, history appears to be on the side of trackers: in 2008, the Wall
Street Journal declared them “relics” on the “verge of extinction.” In 2016, tax lawyers from Fried
Frank—where Prof. Ginsburg once worked—proclaimed, with apologies to Mark Twain, that
reports of the death of trackers are “greatly exaggerated.” A new wave of trackers had emerged,
offering compelling rationales.
Revival. In 2013, Fantex, whose business consists of separate branding contracts with
professional athletes, offered trackers tied to the economic value of those contracts; in 2014,
Fidelity National Financial Inc., a title insurance company with an investment strategy focused on
individual businesses, offered trackers tied to its core business as well as those investees; in 2016,
Dell used tracking stock as part of its purchase of EMC Corp., tracking EMC’s 80%-owned
subsidiary, VMWare, Inc., a publicly-traded software company.
Researchers at Merrill Lynch in 2016 published a paper identifying all the familiar benefits
as well as costs and stressed that trackers are only advisable when a company can offer a
compelling rationale. It devoted a full page depicting nearly a dozen Liberty Media trackers, and
said: “The tracking stocks and spin-offs issued by Liberty from 2004-2015 have resulted in an outperformance vs. the S&P 500 Index of >200% for the Liberty investor.”
Aside from segmenting the shareholder base between transients and QSs, trackers may also
dramatically reduce the indexing cohort. This is because many index providers, such as the S&P
500, exclude companies with tracking stocks from their index—as some likewise do to companies
with dual class capital structures. The same result follows for companies with subsidiaries that are
publicly traded.
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2. Public Subsidiaries. While indexing offers some advantages to companies and
shareholders alike, too much indexing can be a negative. For managers and directors concerned
about excessive concentration of indexers in their stock, a few observations are warranted. For
one, despite the pervasiveness and scale of indexers, many wonderful publicly-traded companies,
large and small, avoid inclusion on indexes altogether and even more are outside the index-heavy
populations such as the S&P 500. This is because the index managers apply various filters in
assembling indexes.
While index managers such as the S&P may appear to sweep up all companies possessing
specific criteria of size or sector, most apply additional screening rules. Companies in the screens
are excluded from certain indexes, reducing the proportion of their shareholder base drawn from
the indexing cohort.
Some screens offer most companies no flexibility to reduce index exposure. For instance,
U.S. index managers usually exclude non-U.S. issuers and few companies would opt for an
overseas incorporation solely to reduce the percentage of indexers in the shareholder base. In fact,
the opposite may be more common—non-U.S, companies, such as Alibaba, say, reincorporating
in the U.S. to expand the index cohort.
Another screen excludes companies with a majority shareholder.98 One way a company
could take advantage of this screen is through subsidiary IPOs—the company lists a minority
interests in a subsidiary. As the parent, the company parent enjoys ownership along with fellow
shareholders who are not indexers. That translates into a more rational stock price and a more
engaged shareholder base focused on business performance. Additional advantages include the
following:99
• Market Valuation—By giving third-party investors a basis to value subsidiaries directly
in public equity markets, the listing offers parent shareholders an objective measure of the value
of its publicly traded subsidiaries.
• Transparency—As public companies and SEC registrants, these subsidiaries provide
financial disclosures that enhances transparency for parent shareholders.
• Self-financing—The subsidiaries can, with greater ease, directly access capital markets
to finance operations and expansion, if needed.
• Recruiting top talent—The opportunity to hold a senior executive position in a publiclytraded company is appealing to most candidates.
Subsidiary IPOs also pose downsides, of course. Disagreements or conflicts can arise
between the boards and managers of the parent and sub. Such downsides were delineated by Sony
in 2013 when it rejected activist pressure to publicly offer minority shares in its entertainment unit.
Sony pointed to parental reversals of subsidiary IPOs after several years at News Corporation (of
Fox Entertainment) and Time Warner (of American Television and Cable).
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In some cases, trackers would be better for shareholders, for the advantages described
earlier. Both alternatives warrant consideration, as does yet another: spin-offs, a device also of
great value in deterring activists.
3. Spins. In recent years, amid calls for focusing rather than diversifying, managers find it
increasingly difficult to justify conglomerates. A few companies have justified sprawling diversity
on organizational grounds—Berkshire is a prominent example, but widely seen as one-of-a-kind,
too exceptional to use as a model for public companies, at least outside the insurance industry. For
most, attempts at justification fall flat and invite activists who push for prompt divestitures. To
avoid that fate, and win over QSs, a regular program of growth and trimming may make more
sense.
Activists have long favored spin-offs, the most common form of separation transaction. A
parent corporation declares a tax-free dividend, to all its shareholders, of stock in a subsidiary
business to be separated. Upon payment of the dividend, the spun business becomes a freestanding
independent entity.
Spin-offs were a familiar type of corporate transaction in the 1990s, with some 325 closed
that decade.100 Thereafter, interest slowed to a fraction of that through 2015, but from there interest
renewed and they have become more frequent. Prominent spins—all instigated by activist
investors—include eBay spinning PayPal (at the urging of Carl Icahn); EMC spinning VMware
(Elliott Management); and Timken spinning its steel business (Relational Investors).
Across decades, spins have had multiple uses. They have been used to separate businesses
lacking a continuing strategic fit, such as when AT&T spun off Lucent and NCR in 1996. They
have been used to break up conglomerates, such as when ITT split into three in 1995. In 1998,
Alleghany Corporation, under the leadership of renowned investor-manager John Burns, spun-off
its Chicago Title Corporation business, creating a major new independent insurance company with
an initial market capitalization exceeding $1 billion.
Some managers have used spins to clean up a business plagued by problems, as occurred
with numerous spins out of Tyco International in the years following its financial scandals. A wave
of spinoffs involved separating an operating company’s real estate interests—often into taxadvantaged real estate investment trusts—at such companies as Macy’s and MGM Resorts.
Others have used spins as part of a recurring process that involves both regular business
expansion—whether acquired or organic—and later divestitures of some of them. An example is
Sears Holdings, which from 1993 to 2014 spun off such powerhouses it had nurtured as Allstate,
Dean Witter, Diehard, Discover, and Land’s End.
The results can be mixed, however. A notable serial spinner is IDT Corporation, founded
and long run by Howard Jonas, succeeded in 2014 by his son. The company and its founder are
highly regarded and have achieved substantial shareholders returns, though unevenly. Effecting
spins has been a part of the standard practice—some have performed exceptionally well, others
the opposite.
To illustrate, Straight Path Communications, a 2013 spin that began trading around $5 per
share rose by 2019 to $180, but Zedge, a 2016 spin that began trading at just above $7 was in 2019
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trading below $2. In between, the stock of IDW Media, a 2009 spin, began around $2 and rose to
as high as around $40, before retreating in 2019 to $17. Spins are not for the faint of heart; but
QSs will be attracted to learn more from managers willing to engage with the idea.
John Malone is also an avid proponent of spin-offs, matching his enthusiasm for tracking
stocks. Liberty Media is constantly making acquisitions, but also constantly divesting, whether
directly in selling interests or, more often, in slicing them through spin offs (or trackers). Prominent
spin-offs include: Liberty Global/Discovery, DirecTV, Liberty Global, Starz, and QVC.
The spin-off pushes interests back and outside the entity, negating conglomerate; rather
than creating an empire under consolidated rule, it is as if the king hives off earldoms, dukedoms,
and other fiefdoms and locates them where their value will be best appreciated.
Underlying the trackers and spins, as well as the rest of Malone’s approach are optimizing
leverage, efficient taxation, opportunistic deal making. In addition, such structures lead to internal
growth of talented managers and better incentive programs. The output from these efforts are
extraordinary shareholder returns, a compound annual growth rate since 2006 of roughly 18%
Such results attract QS.
Spins have become increasingly common in recent years as a way to increase focus and
related capital allocation, whether at conglomerates or otherwise. As such, a strategy that includes
spin-offs as a regular element can be a strong general deterrent to activists, as well as a source of
shareholder value.
C. Trading Activity
Professor Rock notes that listing on major exchanges signals credibility.101 Listing
decisions could well be important to nascent corporations or a factor in some, especially foreign
corporations, seeking a dual listing.102 Some companies cross-list to attract investors in specific
additional locales. While cross listing may add shareholders in a new geography, this may include
every type of shareholder. Managers do well to signal their particular appeal to QSs.
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq (once known as NASDAQ) are arch
rivals engaged an intense competitive battle for listings, so corporate managers would certainly
have an opportunity to consider which listing, if either, delivers a more sought-after shareholder
base. For purposes of this Article, it is worth considering whether one or the other is more or less
appealing to QS. As the following discussion will conclude, it does not, although the recentlyformed Long Term Stock Exchange promises to disrupt the prevailing model.
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An instructive case concerns Fairfax Financial. The company, long listed on the Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSE), in late 2002 added a NYSE listing. Fairfax had publicly discussed the listing for several
years before completing it. The rationale was to attract U.S. investors and assist U.S. employees in owning
the stock. But it also attracted substantial short-sellers which, Fairfax believes, manufactured negative
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that Fairfax, by then a well-known global firm, delisted from the NYSE, saving associated administrative
costs.
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The different stock exchanges have established branded reputations for certain kinds of
companies, with at least some small effect on attracting different investors. The NYSE, for
example, has the blue-chip reputation, a ring of the establishment and permanence. On the other
hand, the Nasdaq built its brand as home to vanguard tech companies.103
Stock exchanges facilitate trading between buyers and sellers through firms which
intermediate the demand and supply sides for pay. The compensation—which covers their own
services and costs of system administration—is the bid-ask spread, the difference between the
price intermediaries charge buyers for a stock and the price intermediaries pay sellers for it.
There is always a spread, but size varies with supply and demand and drivers such as
volume and liquidity. For instance, the spread in trading currencies is almost always tiny, as those
are the deepest and most liquid type of markets in the world. For stock markets, on the NYSE, the
average spread (expressed as a percentage of the bid) is about ½ of one percent (50 basis points)
while on the Nasdaq spreads average about 2.5% (250 basis points).104
Lower bid-ask spreads have inspired some companies to move from the Nasdaq to the
NYSE, including Berkshire and Markel. But that was in the period through the early 2000s, when
the general pattern saw companies first list on Nasdaq and later migrate to the NYSE;105 since
2005, a more common pattern has involved NYSE-listed companies moving to Nasdaq. Oracle’s
2013 move from Nasdaq to NYSE was among the last of the traditional moves; Pepsi’s 2017 was
among the largest relisting in the new direction. Charles Schwab made a round-trip: switching
from NYSE to Nasdaq in 2005 and later back.
The NYSE used to brag about its dominant position, declaring in its 2007 annual report:
From 2001 to 2006, 121 companies transferred their listing from Nasdaq to
the NYSE. During that same period, only five companies voluntarily transferred
from the NYSE to Nasdaq.106
But that was when NYSE listing rules made it difficult for companies to leave. Departure
required board and audit committee votes, notices to all shareholders, and outreach to the largest
shareholders. After the NYSE repealed those requirements under pressure, Nasdaq has been on a
competitive tear.
Nasdaq’s 2007 annual report boasted of poaching 32 companies from the NYSE and 30
from the (soon-defunct) American Stock Exchange. Every Nasdaq annual report since describes
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the competition for market share between Nasdaq and NYSE and tallies companies relisting from
the NYSE. As of 2018, Nasdaq said it had poached a total of some 300 listings, boasting a total
market capitalization of $1.5 trillion.
Table 2 tabulates switches from NYSE to Nasdaq for the past decade. It includes quite a
few companies scoring high in QS density, including Automatic Data Processing, CME Group,
News Corp., PepsiCo, Workday, and Xcel Energy. However, overall, the distribution of these
companies does not support concluding that the switch is associated with higher QS densities.107
Table 2 Relisting from NYSE to Nasdaq
Year

No. $B Cap

Examples

2008

9

130

News Corp., Automatic Data Processing, CME Group, Jack in the
Box, Celera, Mylan, Seagate Technology

2009

10

154

BMC Software, Cypress Semiconductor, Dreamworks Animation,
Mattel, Micron Technology, Network Equipment Technologies, R.R.
Donnelley & Sons, TriMas Corp., Vodafone Group, Windstream
Corp.

2010

3

10

Hasbro, Avis Budget Group, Potlatch Corp.

2011

7

42

Fifth Street Finance Corp., Frontier Communications Corp., Icahn
Enterprises, Magnetek, SLM Corp., Viacom Inc., Wendy’s

2012

16

135

Kraft Foods, Texas Instruments, Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Analog
Devices

2013

31

47

VimpelCom, Marriott International, Amdocs Limited

2014

17

5

Office Depot

2015

27

84

T‐Mobile US, CSX Corp., Pinnacle Entertainment, TD Ameritrade
Holding Corp.

2016

20

61

IHS Markit, Imperva, OPKO Health, Scripps Networks Interactive,
tronc, Trupanion, Willis Towers Watson

2017

11

218

PepsiCo, Principal Financial Group, Workday

2018

18

111

Xcel Energy, United Continental Holdings, Regency Centers Corp.,
Avent, Newell Brands, Weight Watchers International

Source: Table compiled from annual reports on 10K of Nasdaq Inc.

There may be good reasons for a company to switch between the Nasdaq and the NYSE.
But the frequency and stated rationales for such shifting suggest the causes are due more to the
competition between those rivals stirring up the moves than obvious shareholder benefits.
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37

Companies cite cheaper listing fees for corporations. These may diverge significantly.
They run as low as $155,000 on Nasdaq compared with up to $500,000 for the NYSE. But while
that may be attractive to the company, it ignores the relative trading costs shareholders incur,
including due to Nasdaq’s higher bid-ask spreads.
Two other arguments favoring Nasdaq over the NYSE contradict the goal of attracting
more QSs relative to transients and indexers. First, the empirical evidence indicates that the switch
tends to increase trading costs and attract transients.108
Second, one consequence of a Nasdaq listing is potential inclusion in its famous indexes,
such as the QQQ or the Nasdaq 100.109 While some may see that as appealing, it is a disadvantage
to any company wishing to attract a relatively greater density of QSs compared to indexers.
Inclusion in an index automatically means being purchased—or sold—by a large number
of investors whose decisions are not based on the company’s performance or prospects but merely
its inclusion. The automatic trading by indexers adds liquidity, supra note xxx, attracting more
transients. Worse, index membership tends to drive price up, sometimes above value, because
purchases and sales are made based not on value but on price.
Exchanges rarely compete for branding around long-term companies and associated
shareholders—after all, their lifeblood is trading. Yet an upstart, called the Long-Term Stock
Exchange (LTSE), is poised to shake that up. Proposed listing standards aim to attract QSs.
In terms of the corporate menu, LTSE-listed companies would be expected to publicize
their long-term strategy, update it annually, and provide relevant metrics to judge its success. In
addition, companies would be prohibited from offering quarterly guidance. Among topics
discussed elsewhere in this Article, LTSE supports time-weighted voting and disclosure of how
share buybacks affect earnings per share. To quote LTSE’s pitch:
By aiming to reduce companies’ sensitivity to quarterly pressure and
introduce greater accountability for the behaviors that create long-term value, the
LTSE is working to forge a new relationship between long-term focused companies
and their investors.
To date, shareholders have not generally expressed great preference over a company’s
exchange listing. LTSE’s arrival promises to change that.
D. Director Selection
Today’s shareholder cohorts take different approaches to the director selection process.
Through the 1970s, corporate directors were chosen by chief executives, who valued shared
outlooks and offered unwavering support. From the 1980s through the early 2000s, institutional
shareholders gained a greater voice in the selection process as they applied pressure to appoint
directors with greater independence. Today, that voice is as fragmented as the shareholder base it
is supposed to serve.
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While it is difficult to determine, empirically, which methods or structures are superior, it
is illuminating to highlight some of the important differences among the approach to director
selection by today’s dominant shareholder cohorts.
1. Stewards. QSs seek directors with a shareholder orientation, business savvy, and interest
in the particular company and its stewardship. They are more interested in those particular director
traits, and the specific context of a given company, than following general formulas or perceived
best practices.110
The number-one question QSs want to know about any director candidates, however, is
whether they are shareholder oriented. That is, all directors should act as if there is a single
absentee owner and do everything reasonably possible to advance that owner’s long-term interest.
This is not a mandate for the immediate maximization of shareholder value, but rather a
mentality to evaluate every decision from the shareholder perspective. To that end, it is desirable
for directors to buy and hold sizable personal stakes in companies they serve, so that they truly
walk in the shoes of owners.
The board’s most important job is selecting an outstanding CEO. If the board secures an
outstanding CEO, it will likely face few other major problems. All CEOs must be measured
according to a set of performance standards. A board’s outside directors must formulate these
standards and regularly evaluate the CEO in light of them—without the CEO being present.
Standards should be tailored to the particular business culture but should stress
fundamental baselines, such as returns on shareholder capital and progress in market value per
share over multiple years. Above all, directors should evaluate the CEOs record on capital
allocation measured against a hurdle rate it sets.
Directors need to think independently to tighten the wiggle room that “long-term” gives to
CEOs: although corporate leaders should think in terms of years, not quarters, they must not
rationalize sustained subpar performance by perpetual pleas to shareholder patience. After all,
long-term can be excessive, passing into a euphemism for endless mediocrity. The solution:
directors who insist on achieving measurable intermediate goals as well.
If the CEO’s performance persistently falls short of the standards set by the directors, then
the board must replace the CEO. The same goes for all other senior managers boards oversee, just
as an intelligent owner would if present. In addition, the directors must be the stewards of owner
capital to contain any managerial overreach that dips into shareholders’ pockets. Such
pickpocketing can range from imperious acquisition sprees to managerial enrichment through
interested transactions or even myopia amid internal scandal and related crisis.
In addressing these problems, the director’s actions must be fair, swift, and decisive.
Directors who perceive a managerial problem should immediately alert other directors to the issue.
If enough are persuaded, concerted action can be readily coordinated to resolve the problem.
Here, too, shareholders can play a role. As discussed in chapter 7, companies can make
their directors available to their largest long-term QSs. These representatives can discuss issues
put to shareholder votes that affect enduring value. A few influential QSs, acting together, can
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Warren Buffett’s Ten Commandments for Directors, NACD
DIRECTORSHIP (July-August 2017).
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effectively reform a given company’s corporate governance simply by withholding their votes for
directors who were tolerating odious behavior.
2. Formulaic Selection. Indexers seldom nominate directors. In fact, during the past five
years, none of the largest three indexers—which own enormous swaths of corporations
worldwide—have formally nominated a single director to any public company board.111
Large indexers adopt their own guidelines stating general criteria for selection and voting
while others consult the similar guidelines produced by proxy advisers. Index proponents
repeatedly express their view that popular governance reform features are good for most
companies across a portfolio, not necessarily for all.112
Consider the approach of the leading proxy adviser, Institutional Shareholder Service
(ISS). ISS opens its discussion of the board of directors not with statements of competence or
corporate stewardship, but with “four fundamental principles [that] apply when determining votes
on director nominees.”
These are enumerated as independence, composition, responsiveness and accountability.
Only the assessment of “responsiveness,” tends to be contextual—a statement of voting “case-bybase.”
On independence, ISS makes three prescriptions: (1) a majority of directors must be
independent; (2) the board must have three standing committees operating under formal charters
and staffed only with independent directors—audit, compensation, and nominating; and (3) there
must either be a lead independent director or an independent chairman (not also serving as an
executive officer).
Many such rules have become commonly accepted in recent decades, but the empirical
evidence on their economic value remains inconclusive.113 While the prescribed committees and
their functions are required by federal law or stock exchange rules, director expertise is often of
even greater value than independence. Unmentioned by the indexers are valuable alternatives such
as committees on capital allocation or investment—as described above.
While indexers support a rule splitting the chair and CEO roles, it is not always desirable.
The theory is that boards elect and oversee the CEO so having one person wear both hats creates
a conflict. Yet that is only one vote among boards with many independent directors, so any conflict
can easily be neutralized.
Many corporations thrive when led by an outstanding person serving as both chairman and
chief executive just as others have failed when the roles are split. Companies are about evenly
divided on the practice: about half the S&P 500 split the functions while the other half combine
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them. QSs appear to think about this case-by-case and, if anything, slightly favor companies that
combine rather than split the functions.114
On composition, ISS again states three rules: (1) directors should have diverse skills that
add value to the board, rather than duplicating backgrounds from particular viewpoints, ideally
presented in a graphical skills matrix to illustrate; (2) regular meeting attendance is expected,
defined as at least 75% of meetings of the full board and committees; and (3) attention is expected,
determined by caps on the number of public company boards individual directors may serve—five
in general or two for CEOs.
Critics challenge these composition directives as intrusive and formulaic. Taking (2) and
(3) first, attendance and attention are clearly necessary, but not sufficient, to determine a valuable
board member. Rules of thumb are useful, but that’s not how these rules operate. That is why the
board of directors’ section of so many corporate websites portray check marks ticking off all the
governance formulas that major indexers and proxy advisors champion.
While it is prudent to be concerned about anyone stretching themselves too thin, an
artificial definition, such as a maximum of two or five boards, is arbitrary and bound to miss the
mark often. After all, outstanding directors with no other occupation can almost certainly handle
more than six, while the least conscientious busy professional might find one too much.
On accountability, ISS calls for regular director elections, opposes staggered terms, and
believes in shareholder removal power, with or without cause. But state corporate law permits all
these and many other approaches to director election and removal, and leaves it to companies to
choose those best suited for their circumstances.
On staggered boards, proponents stress advantages such as continuity and institutional
knowledge while critics cite insulation from accountability. But answers to such issues require
context. Some evidence indicates that staggered boards add value.115 Companies continue to be
divided on the right approach.116 What’s clear is that ISS favors regimentation over context on this
issue and many others where QS prefer a contextual approach.117
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Just as major indexers do not nominate directors, they rarely initiate shareholder proposals.
For instance, their guidelines express a preference for annual director elections rather than for
staggered board terms. While indexers often support related proposals by other shareholders, the
largest among them have never put forth their own proposals to make such a change.118
Defenders of indexers urge deference to their relative intervention, saying their vast
economies of scale warrant presuming that their decisions are in the best interests of their
investors.119 Critics of indexers say these practices show they are beholden to management.120 Still
others chalk this up to “rational reticence:” proponents incur all costs of proposals but gain a
fraction of the payoff, so it is rational to free ride by supporting others without taking the lead.121
The notion of rational reticence may be reinforced by a further possibility: the guidelines
reflect “best practices” that are probably desirable for most while indexer inaction reflects that
such practices are certainly undesirable for some. If indexers lack resources to determine what is
best in given cases, the rational strategy may be to avoid taking the initiative but to support others
who do so.
E. Dual Class and Voting
The shareholder cultivation literature has devoted considerable attention to alternative
capital structures and voting regimes, especially dual class shares and weighted-voting. Professor
Rock opines that dual class shares are costly and infrequent but seems to work in maintaining
controlling-shareholder structure.122 Professor Masulis observes that dual class shares may have
an adverse effect where insiders extract self-benefit and reduce company value to outside
shareholders.123
One alternative is tenured voting (time-phased voting). These plans give long-term
shareholders more votes.124 The logical upshot of the foregoing updating of the shareholder
cultivation literature, of course, would be to refine tenured voting further to give quality
shareholders more votes.125 While administrative challenges appear, the appeal to QS as a
cultivation tool may be the most compelling of all. Certainly, it deserves a prominent place on both
the corporate menu and the scholarly debating room.
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CONCLUSION
This Article significantly expands the literature on corporate cultivation to shareholders to
sculpt a shareholder base. The premise for doing so is intuition and evidence about the value to
corporations, and society, of a substantial cohort that is both patient and concentrated. A high
density of such shareholders is associated with superior corporate performance. In a world
increasingly dominated by index investors, a vibrant QS cohort is especially vital. Managers
wishing to attract QS in greater density can use both communications channels and substantive
decisions to attract QS and repel others. In reviewing these tools, the Articles adds to the case for
empowering quality and outlines numerous tools available to corporate managers to do so. While
all shareholders contribute something to corporate life, cultivating quality promises outsized
rewards to managers and investors alike. This Article can be seen as an updated playbook
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